

GLOBALIZING MOROCCO

*Transnational Activism and
the Postcolonial State*

David Stenner

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INTRODUCTION

NETWORKED
ANTICOLONIAL
ACTIVISM

IN NOVEMBER 1952, a group of Moroccan anti-colonial activists gathered in New York to advocate before the United Nations for their country's independence from French and Spanish colonial rule. They had come to receive the global body's approval of their demands less than a decade after the formation of the Moroccan nationalist movement during World War II. Notwithstanding the dark suits and leather briefcases that made them look like regular diplomats, they had no legal standing in the new headquarters of international diplomacy due to their country's colonial status. But the representatives of several sovereign states offered their assistance and provided the nationalists with passports that identified them as members of the Saudi, Indonesian, Pakistani, Iraqi, or Yemeni delegations. They could thus attend committee meetings dealing with colonial affairs. Pakistan's eloquent foreign minister at the time, Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, threw the full weight of the Islamic world behind

their demands during a debate in the UN General Assembly on the situation in North Africa. Despite considerable French efforts to keep the Moroccan question off the agenda, the nationalists gained a partial victory when the gathered delegates adopted a resolution confirming “the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco.”¹ From the nationalist viewpoint, “the very fact . . . [that] the UN considered itself competent to deal with the Moroccan problem and pass a resolution” constituted a “victory” for their cause, even though the declaration had failed to explicitly condemn France.²

Many of their compatriots back home followed the campaign in New York with great excitement. A close confidant of Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef informed the activists of the “delight of our Excellency about the presentation of the [Moroccan] case [abroad]”;³ poets recited verses in praise of the UN;⁴ and a nationalist communiqué celebrated the fact that “our brothers in America issue a weekly news publication every Friday [which] is distributed to . . . public and university libraries . . . and important personalities who follow our case.”⁵ The anticolonial weekly *al-Istiqlal* frequently published articles and editorials from US newspapers to keep its readership informed about “the reactions of American [public] opinion.”⁶ As one nationalist informed his brother in New York, “The people here pay a lot of attention to the news and we often hear the details in the street before we read them in the newspapers, all of which comes from listening to the various radio stations. . . . They follow the situation in America and the people here attach great hope [to it].”⁷

The Moroccan struggle for independence had gone global. But how exactly did the nationalists internationalize their case so successfully that even the UN eventually deliberated the issue? How did they communicate their message abroad given that almost none of them spoke any English? Why did the international media eventually engage with the demands of activists from a somewhat obscure kingdom in northwestern Africa as an Iron Curtain descended over Europe and the ensuing tensions threatened to drag the entire planet into yet another world war? While certainly impressive in hindsight, the eventual success of their anticolonial campaign had not been predetermined when it began in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Few contemporary observers would have anticipated that the Moroccan question might soon attract considerable international attention.

To overcome the obstacles in their path, the Moroccans adopted an innovative strategy that positioned them in the vanguard of worldwide anti-colonial movements, many of which would emulate them in future decades. They succeeded by creating a network of sympathizers that enabled them to raise global awareness for their case. Former intelligence agents, British journalists, Asian diplomats, Egyptian Islamists, Coca-Cola executives, Western labor activists, Catholic intellectuals, French socialists, a Nobel laureate, a US Supreme Court judge, Chilean businessmen, a former American First Lady, and many others supported their efforts. These allies not only translated the nationalists' demands into their specific cultural contexts but also legitimized the calls for an independent Morocco among their compatriots by speaking out against colonial rule in the Maghrib. The result was an international alliance that spanned across four continents and successfully brought the nationalists' case to the attention of world public opinion. Ultimately, it even convinced the UN General Assembly to address the status of the North African kingdom.

This diplomatic victory was the outcome of years of lobbying that had led the activists across the entire globe. Organized around offices in Tangier, Paris, Cairo, and New York, the Moroccans successfully advocated for their country's independence.⁸ Those executing this campaign, however, were not the leaders of the nationalist movement, known to us from the standard accounts of Maghribi historiography. Instead, a number of young activists relocated abroad to generate worldwide interest in the Moroccan question by assembling a global alliance demanding the abrogation of the colonial regimes. Moreover, after the North African kingdom had finally achieved independence in March 1956, all of them played important roles in the creation of the postcolonial state. Hitherto deemed to have been of minor relevance, these transnational activists made vital contributions to Moroccan history.

By the time the nationalists made their voices heard on the world stage, their country had been subject to colonial rule for more than three decades following the collapse of the Moroccan state in the early twentieth century.⁹ Signed in March 1912 by then-sultan Abdelhafid, the Treaty of Fez had granted France the right and duty to "inaugurat[e] a regular regime in Morocco based upon internal order and general security, making it possible to introduce reforms and to insure the economic development of the country,"

with a resident general being “charged with the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests abroad.”¹⁰ It also promised to “safeguard the religious status, the respect and traditional prestige of the Sultan.”¹¹ Paris signed a separate agreement with Madrid eight months later, based on a clause in the Treaty of Fez that had promised an “understanding with the Spanish government regarding the interests, which this government has in virtue of its geographical position and territorial possessions on the Moroccan coast.”¹² The deal designated a northern strip along the Mediterranean as the “Spanish zone of influence . . . governed by a caliph [*khalifa*] under the supervision of a Spanish high commissioner, which caliph shall be chosen by the sultan from two candidates proposed by the Spanish government.”¹³ The question of the port city of Tangier remained open until 1923, when France, Spain, and Great Britain agreed on a multinational administration led by a committee of control.¹⁴

Morocco’s tripartite division led to the proliferation of anticolonial resistance movements—initially armed but later political—across much of the country.¹⁵ By May 1930, the scions of the country’s urban bourgeoisie challenged the protectorate authorities through mass protests against the so-called Berber *dahir* (edict), which replaced Islamic with customary law in many rural regions and thus aimed to fragment Moroccan society.¹⁶ But the trajectories of the two zones diverged soon thereafter. The Spanish high commissioner in Tetouan granted legal recognition to *Hizb al-Islah al-Watani* (Party of National Reform, PNR) in December 1936 and encouraged its leaders’ partial integration into the colonial apparatus. The French authorities, by contrast, temporarily exiled in November 1937 most of the activists from the territory under their control. Ultimately, the hardships caused by World War II proved pivotal for the transformation of Moroccan anticolonialism into a nationalist movement that openly called for an immediate abrogation of the protectorates. In December 1943 in Rabat, several dozen young men founded *Hizb al-Istiqlal* (Independence Party), which quickly grew into the country’s largest political organization. Although separated by different colonial regimes, both parties coordinated their activities. This applied particularly to their campaign abroad.

The complex legal reality of the two protectorates forced the nationalists to structure their struggle for independence around two important facts.

First, Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef literally embodied the last vestiges of Moroccan sovereignty, since it was for his “protection” that the entire colonial edifice had been erected. Second, the Spanish protectorate existed solely as a French concession—if Paris ever nullified the Treaty of Fez, the government in Madrid would have to withdraw its officials as well. For these reasons, activists from both zones embraced Sidi Mohammed, as the monarch was also known, as the country’s symbol of unity, fully capable of leading his people toward a prosperous future. Moreover, it meant that everyone—including the nationalists from Tetouan—directed their activities first and foremost against France. Doing so had become both easier and more difficult in the face of recent world events: whereas the UN provided an ideal platform for reaching out to world public opinion, the constraints of the emerging Cold War threatened to marginalize the interests of the decolonizing world. Nowhere did this become more apparent than in North Africa.

DECOLONIZATION AND THE COLD WAR

The end of World War II not only heralded the beginning of a new age on the European continent but also remade the relationships between the Western powers and the world’s colonized peoples.¹⁷ Having witnessed their empires contract during six years of total warfare, politicians in London, Paris, The Hague, and beyond sought to salvage their colonial possessions from the ruins of the global conflict. Yet that was easier said than done. France’s Fourth Republic, for example, emerged materially devastated and morally tarnished by the legacy of the collaborationist Vichy regime. Many French citizens nonetheless expected the reconstruction of the colonies from Indochina to North Africa to secure their country’s economic well-being and restore its shattered national pride. Even politicians that had risked their lives in the resistance against the Nazi occupation did not hesitate to order the brutal repression of anticolonial movements overseas.¹⁸ But the defeat of the European armies by the German *Wehrmacht* had shattered their aura of invincibility in the eyes of the colonial subjects, who deemed a continuation of the status quo neither desirable nor inevitable. The two decades after 1945 thus saw the clash of two antagonistic currents: recolonization and decolonization.

Two events symbolized this contradictory transformation of global politics. Just three weeks after the Istiqlal Party had unilaterally declared Morocco's independence on 11 January 1944, the leaders of the Free French Forces gathered in Brazzaville, then capital of French Equatorial Africa, to plan the resurrection of a reformed empire following the end of the war (they emphatically rejected the "autonomy" and "self-government of the colonies even in the long term").¹⁹ An even more emblematic incident occurred on 8 May 1945. While crowds from Los Angeles to Moscow celebrated Nazi Germany's surrender, the local population in Sétif commemorated VE Day by demanding an end to colonial rule. Instead of acknowledging the validity of their demands, though, the French authorities massacred thousands of Algerian Muslims.²⁰ European statesmen denied their colonial subjects the very same freedoms for which they had fought against Hitler and his allies. What seemed like a moment of liberation to some actually meant new forms of oppression for others.

Yet despite the colonial powers' feverish attempts to reassert their control, a tectonic shift in international relations had made such endeavors unfeasible: politicians in European capitals no longer decided the fate of the world, but their counterparts in Washington and Moscow seeking to recruit client states to their respective camps did.²¹ The ultimate symbol of this dramatic transformation occurred during the Suez Crisis of November 1956, which came to an abrupt conclusion when US president Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev jointly forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their invading armies from Egypt. Such moments of cooperation remained rare, however, since the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union had already given way to a new rivalry that soon enough encompassed all five continents.²² As the promise of "a world free of want and fear" outlined by the Atlantic Charter in 1941 became an ever-more-distant dream, the hopes of many observers rested on a new intergovernmental organization designed to promote international cooperation.

The United Nations symbolized the nascent global order after its establishment in 1945; its two-tier structure consisting of the Security Council and the General Assembly emphasized the organization's hierarchical nature, and it initially did little to encourage anticolonial nationalism around

the globe. It sought stability, not revolutionary change.²³ But notwithstanding its founders' conservative intentions, the UN soon came to embody the hopes of many Africans and Asians, who viewed it as a forum through which they could mobilize "world opinion" against the colonial powers.²⁴ After all, its founding charter had proclaimed "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and thus appeared to fulfill the promises made by the Allies during the war years; three years later, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights outlined the "common standard of achievement for all peoples" that included the "dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family" and permitted "rebellion against tyranny" as a last resort.²⁵

Although the colonial powers had done everything possible to prevent the gathered delegates from incorporating radically anticolonial language into the UN's founding documents, they left the conference fearful that the nascent intergovernmental organization would inevitably herald the end of their empires.²⁶ The flood of petitions inundating the UN demonstrated its appeal to women and men across the colonized world.²⁷ Transnational alliances of nongovernmental organizations such as the International Association of Democratic Lawyers and the International League of the Rights of Man helped African nationalists appeal to a global public as well as to the responsible UN committees.²⁸ And an itinerant clergyman established the Africa Bureau in New York to advocate for Namibian independence.²⁹ These activists also received support from influential grassroots movements such as the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), which used its contacts among US politicians to actively assist a wide range of anticolonial causes.³⁰ "Everything done to inform the world about the situation of the subject peoples slowly promotes their emancipation," French legal scholar André Mathiot noted in 1949 with regard to the organization's ability to "submit colonial policies to public opinion."³¹

The emergence of the UN as the center of international diplomacy thus both contributed to and paralleled the age of decolonization.³² The Moroccan nationalists visiting New York sought to take advantage of trends that pointed to the decline of empire across the globe, only some of which can be attributed to the intergovernmental organization. The Philippines in 1946, India and Pakistan in 1947, Burma in 1948, Indonesia in 1949, Libya in 1951,

and Vietnam in 1954 all secured their independence within the decade following the end of World War II and inspired others to follow in their footsteps. Seeking to make the voices of Africa and Asia heard around the world, twenty-nine non-Western nations met in Bandung in 1955 to take a stance against imperialism and reestablish their peoples as independent historical actors.³³ A different world suddenly seemed possible. Statesmen from across the globe founded the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade six years later to move beyond neutrality toward a much more assertive stance that would exploit the tensions of the Cold War to their own benefit.³⁴ Unwilling to maintain their subservient position vis-à-vis the former colonial powers, they sought to transform the entire world;³⁵ the resulting rise of South-South relations created a new sphere of politics outside the confines of Western control.³⁶ Whereas the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union had begun as a bilateral confrontation, it quickly became a multipolar conversation.³⁷ And the Moroccans wanted to participate in it.

The potential of decolonization to bring about radical change was best expressed by the term *Third World*, which many opponents of Western hegemony eagerly embraced.³⁸ Originally coined by the French geographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952, it echoed the ideals of the French revolutionaries so famously expressed by Abbé Sieyès in 1789. (“What is the Third Estate? Everything. What has it been until now in the political order? Nothing. What does it want to be? Something.”)³⁹ But within the context of the Cold War, the expression also advocated for the “positive neutrality” of the non-Western world with regard to the binary geopolitical conflict. It reflected the desire of the colonial peoples to assert themselves on the world stage as sovereign nations and galvanized the hopes of many—including some in Europe and North America—at the height of the era of decolonization.⁴⁰

Morocco was no exception in this regard. Even before the notion of a Third World became an integral part of the global political vocabulary, the country’s nationalist press had advocated for the creation of “a third force of small states at the UN maintaining a balance . . . [between] the two powerful states,” thus indicating that it understood the local anticolonial struggle as inherently intertwined with the Cold War.⁴¹ At the same time, though, the Moroccans rejected the term’s more radical implications. Although they wanted to free themselves from all vestiges of the colonial era, they did not

seek a fundamental rupture with either Europe or the United States. Their goal was acceptance as equals within a global system based on representative democracy and liberal capitalism. Aspiring to close relations with both Western and Afro-Asian capitals did not seem like a contradiction to them.

GLOBALIZING THE MOROCCAN QUESTION

The rapidly shifting international landscape of the post–World War II decade shaped the Moroccans’ struggle for independence. From a global perspective, it was exactly the right moment to make their case abroad: the European empires displayed clear symptoms of decay, while two new superpowers outbid each other to gain the sympathies of the decolonizing peoples. The bipolar conflict thus provided nationalist movements with leverage to gain independence on their own terms despite the constraints it imposed on them.⁴² It was now or never—the Moroccans had to seize this unique opportunity by appealing directly to the conscience of what came to be known as world public opinion. Thereby, they would exert international pressure that might force France and Spain to relinquish their respective protectorates.⁴³ The solution was the formation of an international network of supporters that allowed them to successfully advocate for Moroccan independence on the global stage.

But whereas this networked approach proved very useful throughout the liberation struggle, it became a liability after the end of the protectorates as the country descended into a power struggle that pitted the political elites against each other. Although they had closely cooperated during the years of the anticolonial campaign, the royal palace and the nationalists now vied to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the colonial authorities. The country’s monarch ultimately emerged victorious as he took control of the levers of power by co-opting the central nodes of the advocacy network, thus weakening the Istiqlal and turning it into an opposition party. Its informal nature, lack of a clearly defined membership, and failure to establish a coherent ideology had once constituted advantages but suddenly turned into liabilities; the skills, resources, and personal connections acquired by the nationalists during their campaign abroad strengthened the monarch’s hand as soon as he had drawn the network’s central participants to his side. Through

a careful analysis of the liaisons of activists working on the global level, we can understand how the Istiqlalis managed to win the battle for independence but then abruptly lose the prize of political dominance over the post-colonial state. Instead, Sidi Mohammed laid the groundwork for the authoritarian monarchy that still rules the country today.

The Moroccan nationalists repeatedly referred to their own outreach activities as propaganda.⁴⁴ Of course, that term carries a negative, even derogatory, connotation today. At the time, however, they self-consciously embraced the importance of “confronting the world conscience through propaganda [*di‘āya*] and dissemination of information [*tanshīr*] about the activities of the oppressors.”⁴⁵ And the nationalist press regularly celebrated those traveling abroad “to conduct propaganda for the Moroccan case.”⁴⁶ The term used in this way implied objectivity and truth, not bias and deceit. Even US media outlets such as the *New York Times* occasionally used the term approvingly (“Motion pictures . . . are . . . the best kind of propaganda for the American way of life” one article argued in the context of the early Cold War).⁴⁷ Considering the international media’s general sympathy toward France’s policies, the Moroccans knew that they had to craft their own narratives. To achieve this end, they needed to provide verifiable facts to validate their claims.

Publications such as *Morocco under the Protectorate: Forty Years of French Administration* promised a detailed “analysis of the facts and figures,” all of which had been taken from French government reports.⁴⁸ In the United States, the nationalists’ monthly periodical *Free Morocco*, which reached curious individuals across the entire country, informed its readers that “the Moroccan demands are not extreme” but merely called for the restoration of their compatriots’ “rights and liberties.”⁴⁹ The Moroccans saw their best chance of success in appealing to the liberal conscience of Western publics—at no point did they consider working with the Soviet Union or its allies. (“The foremost aim . . . is to establish a democratic government—a liberal constitutional monarchy and social democracy, where the Moroccan citizens can exercise all their rights as free citizens,” a booklet published in New York in 1953 explained to the reader.)⁵⁰ This tactic proved extremely effective in gaining the sympathies of Western observers, whose increasing hostility toward the colonial regime in Morocco ultimately contributed to the demise of the two protectorates.

NETWORKS, BROKERS, AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

The global campaign conducted by the Moroccan nationalist movement constituted a transnational advocacy network that leveraged international support in order to influence domestic politics.⁵¹ Such networks can span large distances to bring together diverse actors with regard to a specific purpose.⁵² Yet they are not free-floating entities, as their individual members remain embedded within multiple sets of overlapping social relations, both within the network and beyond.⁵³ Methodologically, social-network analysis deals with the interplay of innumerable distinct actions, both complementary and contradictory, and the wider political landscape.⁵⁴ Since the Moroccan struggle for independence occurred within so many spheres simultaneously—French and Spanish imperialism, Cold War diplomacy, Afro-Asian anti-imperialism, intra-Arab politics, and North African nationalism—it offers a suitable approach for understanding the country’s complicated decolonization process.⁵⁵

Central to my argument is the concept of the broker, an individual bridging a structural hole between separate clusters of nodes within a larger network.⁵⁶ These strategically positioned actors are able to channel the flow of resources and thus benefit from their location within the network.⁵⁷ Brokers play crucial roles in consolidating the larger network structure even though they do not necessarily belong to the official leadership of a given social movement.⁵⁸ Their individual success thus cannot be reduced to personal abilities.⁵⁹ As members of transnational coalitions of activists, brokers often fulfill a wide range of important functions simultaneously: as translators, they diffuse knowledge; as coordinators, they distribute resources and information; as articulators, they can negotiate common positions; and, finally, at public events, they might serve as representatives.⁶⁰ Furthermore, they can strengthen the network by serving as bridges to the outside world. It usually is not participation within a dense web of social relations but rather weak ties to persons beyond the intimate circle of close associates that provide access to unique resources.⁶¹ The Moroccan activists and their foreign allies fulfilled these functions in places as far apart as Baghdad and Rio de Janeiro.

This discussion of brokers as central figures within larger network structures is based on the concept of social capital, which is “embodied in relations among persons” rather than innate in individual actors.⁶² By moving beyond a narrow focus on human capital, we can understand the roles played

by specific individuals through analyses of their positions within networks of political activism.⁶³ A pivotal factor influencing the quality of social capital is a person's ability to actually access these resources when needed, which means that the quality of interpersonal relations—the strength of each individual link—is just as important as the quantity.⁶⁴ Although the acquisition of social capital might occur as an unintended consequence of someone's activities, this does not prevent actors from constantly seeking to gain structural autonomy by situating themselves in strategically important locations within the larger network.⁶⁵ Brokers can thus leverage their positions in order to obtain personal benefits to the detriment of their colleagues.⁶⁶ Moreover, their withdrawal has the potential of irreversibly damaging the social movement by drastically reducing the available social capital.

The best way to understand social networks is not as stable entities but as dynamic processes resulting from the constant remaking of interpersonal connections. The Moroccan anticolonial activists continuously recruited new supporters to their movement so as to broaden their coalition. At the same time, the members of the already existing network developed new ties among each other, a process called triadic closure.⁶⁷ The presence of shared acquaintances often brings together individuals that previously had no contact with each other, thereby increasing the network's density through a multiplication of ties among its nodes. No other organizational structure provides the same degree of flexibility necessary for political activists seeking to spread their message on the global stage. And this, in turn, shapes this book's analytical framework, which combines the domestic and the international stages into "dynamic interaction scales" to accurately capture the complexity of the Moroccan anticolonial struggle.⁶⁸

The Moroccan advocacy network consisted of three types of participants: members of the two nationalist parties working to end the protectorate, the sultan who actively supported their efforts, and non-Moroccans who maintained strong connections to the core of activists over extended periods of time. Many of the Moroccans' foreign supporters formed subgroups that remained independent of each other and stood only in contact with a small number of nationalists—although numerous cases of triadic closure did occur. These clusters were divided along lines of geography (some lived in North America, others in Europe and the Middle East), religion and cul-

ture (Jews, Christians, and Muslims), and interest and motivations (Islamist activists and Western intelligence agents, British Orientalists and French socialists). Together they targeted journalists, diplomats, and politicians on four different continents with anticolonial propaganda in order to create international pressure on France and Spain that would ultimately force them to relinquish their respective protectorates.

Within this transnational advocacy network, numerous individuals—both nationalists and some of their foreign supporters—came to occupy central positions that increased their personal standing. They became invaluable assets for the global advocacy campaign by bridging structural holes between Morocco and the outside world. Unlike the official leaders of the Istiqlal and PNR who seemed nominally in charge, these brokers often remained marginal within the official party hierarchies but held positions of great importance within its informal network of contacts.⁶⁹ After the transnational alliance had achieved its goal, however—namely the end of colonial rule—the sudden disappearance of its sole purpose led to the quick unraveling of the entire network. The monarch also contributed to its demise by co-opting individual participants through promises and charisma; some began to work directly inside the palace as press liaison or royal adviser, while others were rewarded with ambassadorships that conveniently removed them from the domestic political stage. Many nationalists gladly left the Istiqlal to work for Sidi Mohammed when offered the prospect of a fulfilling professional career.

In each individual case, the decision seemed quite plausible—after all, had they themselves not constantly portrayed Mohammed ben Youssef as the embodiment of the Moroccan nation throughout the struggle for independence? Clearly, it was an honor to serve their beloved monarch directly. Few viewed this as a binary choice between party and palace, as it might appear to us today. But at the same time, the aggregate of these individual decisions proved fatal for the organized political opposition led by the Istiqlal, which suddenly lost many of its most talented members. The monarch focused his efforts on several brokers because he needed their social capital to legitimize his regime both domestically and internationally. Uniquely capable of seeing the network's fault lines, he skillfully exploited its inherent weaknesses. The very structure of the nationalists' advocacy network might have assured the Istiqlal's success in the short term, but it contributed to its

defeat in the long term. Drawing a clear distinction between the colonial and postcolonial eras thus no longer seems appropriate, as the dynamics of the former clearly shaped the latter.

ANTIREVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALISM

It becomes clear when we move beyond domestic politics that the advocacy campaign conducted by the nationalists was also an important moment in international history. But the Moroccans' activities differed from those of much more radical anticolonial movements that entered the world stage after them. The members of the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), for example, embarked on a "diplomatic revolution" while also conducting a military insurgency against the French colonial state.⁷⁰ Their emphasis on appealing to world public opinion certainly paralleled the strategy adopted by the Moroccans, who generously assisted their Algerian brothers when the latter arrived in New York in early 1955. But unlike the Moroccans, the FLN played off states on both sides of the Cold War divide to further its own cause. Support from several Afro-Asian states became particularly central to its liberation struggle; as a result, the Algerian capital developed into a "Mecca of revolution" after independence in 1962 and attracted anticolonial pilgrims from across the Third World.⁷¹ Within less than a decade, the guerrilla fighters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) also commenced a "global offensive" that ultimately reached from Hanoi and Beijing, via Algiers, to Havana.⁷² And they, too, challenged the international order in hope of securing a liberated Palestinian homeland.

The Moroccans, by contrast, never developed a fundamental critique of the world within which they operated. Although fully aware of its flaws, they believed that the UN would ultimately support their quest for independence. They also idealized the United States as a potential ally even though consecutive administrations in Washington failed to provide any tangible support. Even France maintained a certain attraction among the nationalists. That the Moroccans' honest admiration of many aspects of Western culture never diminished can be traced back to the generous support provided by private citizens throughout the years of the liberation struggle. Moreover, their shared class background inoculated the leaders of the nationalist move-

ment against any notion of radical change. As the scions of the country's old commercial and religious elites, they wanted to regain their rightful social status within Morocco and beyond; the skepticism inherent in socialism toward private property and religion did not appeal to them. Of course, they vigorously opposed colonial racism wherever it manifested itself, and the nationalist press covered liberation struggles from Palestine to Indonesia in great detail. Afro-Asian solidarity constituted an integral part of their identity. Still, the Moroccans rejected the much more extreme implications of Third Worldism and instead positioned themselves as "Wilsonian universalists" firmly planted within the Western camp.⁷³

The history of the Moroccan struggle for independence thus offers new insights into the politics of the early Cold War. The role played by nonstate actors in the making of the post-1945 world order becomes particularly apparent. Their influence certainly did not match that of diplomats from Western capitals, who designed the global institutions to serve their own needs. But these activists carved out spaces for themselves within the international hierarchy. Rather than passively awaiting the eventual collapse of the European empires, they actively contributed to their demise. The Moroccan nationalists surpassed so many who had come before them—or would follow them—due to their ability to create a vibrant coalition of supporters who successfully advocated for their cause worldwide. The status of the North African kingdom had initially seemed like an issue of little importance in the eyes of most contemporary observers, but the nationalists successfully made their concerns global ones.

What follows, then, is a history of the globalization of the Moroccan question through transnational activism and the making of the postcolonial state. It begins during the last years of World War II and concludes after Mohammed ben Youssef's state visit to the United States in late 1957. This book does not talk about heroes or villains but focuses on the myriad individual actors that made Morocco's independence a reality. Most importantly, it analyzes the dynamics that shaped the era of decolonization—perhaps the single most important historical process of the twentieth century—not only in North Africa but across the entire world. Ultimately, it demonstrates the ability of social movements to successfully engage with international politics in order to effect local change.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

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6. See, for example, “Les réactions de l’opinion américaine,” *al-Istiqlal*, 26 April 1952, 2; and “Les grands organes de la presse américaine critiquent sévèrement la politique française en Tunisie,” *al-Istiqlal*, 24 May 1952, 4.
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8. Muhammad al-‘Arabi al-Masari, *Al-Maghrib kharij siyaj al-bimaya* (Rabat, MA: Manshu-rat ‘Akath, 2012), 11–14.
9. Susan G. Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 63–79.
10. “Protectorate Treaty between France and Morocco—March 30, 1912,” *The American Journal of International Law* 6, no. 3 (1912): 207, 209.
11. *Ibid.*, 207.

12. Ibid., 208.
13. "Treaty between France and Spain Regarding Morocco—November 27, 1912," *The American Journal of International Law* 7, no. 2 (1913): 81.
14. Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*, 88.
15. The most important resistance movement was led by Mohammed b. Abdelkarim al-Khattabi in the northern Rif Mountains from 1920 until 1926. María Rosa de Madariaga, *Abdel-Krim el Jatabi: La lucha por la independencia* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2009); and C. Richard Pennell, *A Country with a Government and a Flag: The Rif War in Morocco, 1921–1926* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986).
16. John P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912–1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, 1967), 178–90.
17. Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel, *Dekolonisation—das Ende der Imperien* (Munich: Beck, 2013), 50–52. The relationship between Britain and its former white settler colonies underwent a very similar transformation within the framework of the Commonwealth during this period. See A. G. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization," *Past & Present* 200 (2008).
18. Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and Their Roads from Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76.
19. "Recommendations adoptées par la conférence," in *La Conférence africaine française, Brazzaville: 30 janvier 1944–8 février 1944* (Paris: Ministère des Colonies, 1945), 32.
20. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–62* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006), 23–28.
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22. Odd A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Robert J. McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Tony Smith, "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (2000); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); and Piero Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).
23. Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
24. Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, vol. 2, *The Age of Decolonization, 1955–1965* (Palgrave: New York, 1989), 102.
25. "Charter of the United Nations," chapter 1, article 1, part 2, United Nations, accessed 7 February 2017, <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations>; and "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," preamble, United Nations, accessed 7 February 2017, <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html>. In the eyes of many anticolonial activists, however, the appeal of human rights did not lay in their protection of individuals against the authority of the state but rather in their ability to bring about the "threshold right of self-determination" that protected the "autonomy of the new nation" against foreign intervention. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia—Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010), 117.
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27. Meredith Terretta, *Petitioning for Our Rights, Fighting for Our Nation: The History of the Democratic Union of Cameroonian Women, 1949–1960* (Bamenda, CM: Langaa Research & Publishing CIG, 2013); and Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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30. Carol Anderson, *Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

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32. For a study of how the UN moved beyond serving as a mere platform for anticolonialism and became an active agent in the process of decolonization itself, see Eva-Maria Muschik, “Managing the World: The United Nations, Decolonization, and the Strange Triumph of State Sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s,” *Journal of Global History* 13, no. 1 (2018).

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37. Jason Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1; and Gerard McCann, “From Diaspora to Third Worldism and the United Nations: India and the Politics of Decolonizing Africa,” *Past and Present* 218, suppl. 8 (2013): 260.

38. Mark T. Berger, “After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism,” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004).

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42. Richard H. Immermann and Petra Goedde, eds., introduction to *The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7.

43. Robert Rézette, *Les partis politiques marocains* (Paris: A. Colin, 1955), 196.

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46. “Al-Za’im ‘Allal al-Fasi yusarrihu: Sanutalibu min hai’at al-umam manh al-istiqlal ila al-Maghrib tibqan li-dusturiha,” *al-‘Alam*, 9 July 1952, 1.

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49. “Franco-Moroccan Relations: Facts and Prospects,” *Free Morocco*, 25 July 1953, 1.

50. “Nationalism, Independence and Democracy,” *Free Morocco*, 25 June 1953, 1.

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53. On the concept of *embeddedness* within social networks, see Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," *American Journal of Sociology* 91, no. 3 (1985). For a discussion of the methodological contributions made by network analysis, see Roman Loimeier and Stefan Reichmuth, "Zur Dynamik religiös-politischer Netzwerke in muslimischen Gesellschaften," *Die Welt des Islams* 36, no. 2 (1996): 151–52.

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55. The methodological utility of network analysis for studying political activism on several levels simultaneously has been outlined by Cilja Harders, "Dimensionen des Netzwerkansatzes—Einführende theoretische Überlegungen," in *Die Islamische Welt als Netzwerk*, ed. Roman Loimeier (Würzburg, DE: Ergon, 2000).

56. Ronald S. Burt, *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Ronald S. Burt, "Structural Holes and Good Ideas," *American Journal of Sociology* 110, no. 2 (2004).

57. Ronald S. Burt, "The Network Structure of Social Capital," *Research in Organizational Studies* 22 (2000): 353; and Jeremy Boissevain, *Friends of Friends. Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), chap. 6.

58. Just like Georg Simmel's *tertius gaudens* ("the third who laughs"), brokers benefit from their location between two distinct groups that could no longer communicate in their absence. Georg Simmel, *Soziologie—Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), 82–89.

59. Nan Lin, "Building a Network Theory of Social Capital," *Connections* 22, no. 1 (1999).

60. Marisa von Bülow, "Brokers in Action: Transnational Coalitions and Trade Agreements in the Americas," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (2011): 168.

61. Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (1973).

62. James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94, no. 1 (1988): S98, S118. The term was first defined by Pierre Bourdieu as the "aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition." Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. John Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 249. But unlike scholars who subsequently developed his concept further, Bourdieu viewed social capital only in relation to, and not independent of, economic and cultural capital. In this book, I partially follow Bourdieu's approach: although I do not explicitly deal with economic and cultural capital, I do analyze social capital within the context of related variables, such as the status of individual actors within larger society and their ideological preferences.

63. Ronald S. Burt, *Brokerage and Closure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4.

64. Nan Lin, *Social Capital—A Theory of Social Structure and Action* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31–37.

65. Quoted from James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap

Press, 1990), 312. For a study of actors strategically self-positioning within a network, see Vincent Buskens and Arnout van de Rijt, “Dynamics of Networks If Everyone Strives for Structural Holes,” *American Journal of Sociology* 114, no. 2 (2009); and Roger Gould and Roberto Fernández, “Structures of Mediation: A Formal Approach to Brokerage in Transaction Network,” *Social Methodology* 19 (1989): 104.

66. Ann Mische, *Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth Activist Networks* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 48–49.

67. David Easley and Jon Kleinberg, *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 47–50.

68. Marisa von Bülow, *Building Transnational Networks—Civil Society and the Politics of Trade in the Americas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 191.

69. For a study of leadership in social movements, see Mario Diani “Leaders’ or Brokers? Positions and Influence in Social Movement Networks,” in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 117–18.

70. Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution—Algeria’s Fight and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

71. Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

72. Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

73. For a study of US president Woodrow Wilson’s plan to spread the principle of self-determination in the aftermath of World War I, at least in Europe, as well as the global reception of this principle, see Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

CHAPTER I

1. Moroccan Parties to Moroccan and Arab Public Opinion, communiqué, 9 April 1951, Abdelkhaleq Torres File, vol. 2, BFA.

2. Ibid.

3. Intervención del Territorio de Yebala—Información: Expediente no. 266/Boletín 37, 26 April 1951, 15 (13.01), box 81/2161, Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares (hereafter AGA).

4. Note de renseignements: Séjour des journalistes égyptiens, 9 April 1951, 1MA/200/266, Centre des archives diplomatiques, Nantes (hereafter CADN).

5. Ibid.

6. “Al-Ahزاب al-wataniyya al-‘arb‘a tuwahhidu sufufahum,” *al-‘Alam*, 11 April 1951, 1.

7. *Rézetite, Les partis politiques marocains*, 190–91. The Arab League’s founding members were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan. Yemen joined the organization six weeks later. The League expanded in subsequent decades and currently has twenty-two member states.

8. Note de renseignements: Journalistes égyptiens, 11 April 1951, 1MA/200/266, CADN.

9. Intervención del Territorio de Yebala—Información, 12 April 1951, 15 (13.01), box 81/2161, AGA.

10. “Nadwa kubra yu‘aqiduha al-sahafiyun al-misriyyun bi-Tanja,” *al-‘Alam*, 10 April 1951, 1.

11. “Takrim ba‘that al-sahafa al-misriyya al-‘a‘ida min al-Maghrib,” *al-‘Alam*, 28 April 1951, 1.